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Atonement, Scapegoats, and the 
Oxford Debating Society 
Joe A. Thompson 
"0 xford Atones" read a newspaper headline after the Oxford 
Union Society defeated by 416 votes to 187 the motion "That this 
House would not fight for Queen and Country" on 9 February 
1983, exactly fifty years after the union had carried by 275 votes to 
153 the resolution "That this House will in no circumstances fight 
for its King and Country." Most commentators welcomed the 
"atonement" of Oxford, where, as John Gray wrote in The Wall 
Street Journal, "intellectual trends are first revealed." The second 
Oxford debate was therefore "encouraging and even inspiring. It 
showed signs that many of history's hard lessons had been 
learned." 1 
But for what was Oxford belatedly atoning? Why did 
undergraduate debates receive so much attention? And what were 
the "hard lessons" of history to be learned from the Oxford 
episode? 
For Max Beloff, the celebrated political writer and academician, 
the second debate was occasion for personal atonement. In 1933, 
as an undergraduate, he had spoken for the motion; in 1983, with 
the certitude of hindsight, he had "a duty" to atone because the 
original resolution had been "factually and morally" untrue. It 
was factually false because many of those who had voted for the 
proposition had died fighting in the Second World War. It was 
morally false because the debate at Oxford had "in some slight 
way" encouraged fascist belligerence by implying that Britain was 
too anemic to fight. 2 
For John Gray, and for other commentators who welcomed the 
reversal of the outcome of the 1933 debate, Oxford had a far 
heavier burden on its conscience. It rested on Winston Churchill's 
interpretation of the "ever-shameful" motion. In June 1942 
Churchill had allowed himself to be quoted as saying that "the 
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effect of the Oxford resolution was shattering . . . to our prestige. 
We have actual proof now that Mussolini was so affected by it that 
he definitely came to the conclusion that Britain might be counted 
out, and it is probable that it had a decisive effect on his decision 
to bring in Italy on the side of Germany." 3 In his memoirs, 
Churchill broadened the indictment: as a result of the motion, "in 
Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Japan, the idea of a decadent, 
degenerate Britain took deep root and swayed many 
calculations." 4 In Churchill's view, the Oxford undergraduates had 
an implied responsiblity for the Second World War. 
Ironically, Churchill's son, Randolph, helped turn the Oxford 
vote into a worldwide news story. Its organizers had no thought 
of causing even a local stir. As Martin Ceadel, the historian of the 
debate, has written, it was "an unremarkable Thursday-night's 
relaxation at the Oxford Union" and the outcome was "most 
simply" explained by the oratory of the invited speaker, C. E. M. 
Joad, a popular philosopher and pacifist, and the union's 
convention that "it is good debating that wins votes." 5 But a lively 
piece of undergraduate entertainment became national news 
when a senior editorial writer for the Daily Telegraph planted an 
anonymous letter on the center-page of the Telegraph denouncing 
the Oxford motion as "an outrage upon the memory of those who 
gave their lives in the Great War." 
The letter writer, J. B. Firth, suggested that "decently-minded 
Young Oxford" should work without delay to get the "offensive 
motion" expunged from the minutes of the Union Society. 
Randolph Churchill acted on this suggestion. On 14 February he 
circulated a letter to life members of the union demanding that 
the offending motion be expunged from the minute book. But his 
personal effort to save the honor of Oxford failed when on 2 
March the union rejected by 750 votes to 138 a motion to expunge 
the motion of 9 February. The vote was unrelated to the 
sentiments of the original resolution but turned on Churchill's 
effort to expunge a motion of the House. The Times summed up 
the outcome with the headline: "The Oxford Union: Mr. R. 
Churchill's Visit Resented." 
Randolph Churchill's intervention made the Oxford debate a 
major news story, but it was his father who insisted that it was an 
event of historical importance. In his memoirs the episode 
assumed legendary significance as an event that encouraged the 
dictators to believe that the British would not fight. Historians 
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have found little evidence to sustain Churchill's claim. Although 
reports of the Oxford debate circulated in Germany, no one has 
uncovered evidence that Hitler knew of the episode or was 
influenced by it. Moreover, when Hitler embarked on an 
adventurous foreign policy he did not need to draw upon an 
undergraduate vote for encouragement: Britain's foreign and 
defense policies throughout the 1930s led him to believe that he 
would have a free hand in Europe. 
Mussolini did read English, and had seen accounts of the 
Oxford debate . According to Denis Mack Smith, fascist 
propaganda magnified the Oxford vote "into the unanimous 
opinion of students at Oxford and Cambridge, and then into a 
pacifist vote by all British youth; and Mussolini refused to listen 
to anyone who questioned this reasoning." 6 But Mussolini had a 
more fundamental reason for dismissing Britain as a fighting 
power. To his mind a growth in population was more important 
than an increase in arms production in deciding which country 
would win a major war. According to the Italian office of statistics, 
Britain and France had declining populations, and Mussolini 
believed that in twenty years their populations would be reduced 
by almost half and be composed only of the old. For the same 
reason he claimed that the United States would soon cease to be a 
serious nation .7 For Mussolini, then, the Oxford vote was only a 
symptom of a deeper and more fundamental weakness of British 
society, and the undergraduate debate had no direct and serious 
influence on his calculations. 
II 
But 1983 did more than give Lord Beloff and the Oxford Union 
Society a chance to atone for past sins, real or imagined. It was a 
time for preaching. The lesson to be learned, said Beloff, was that 
nonviolence may be right for private citizens but it could never be 
"the basis of national policy." Lord Hume, the former foreign 
secretary, mixed indictment with admonition. He claimed that a 
powerful and electorally influential pacifist movement, not Oxford 
debaters, had hampered British defense preparations in the 1930s. 
In 1983, he was fearful once again as he saw "unilateralists 
sending out signals to a dictatorship that is mobilized with 
enormous armed forces and practices its doctrine in 
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and Poland." The implication was 
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obvious: 1983 could become 1933 unless the neutralist movement 
of the 1980s was denied the influence of the pacifist movement of 
the 1930s. The latter had not prevented war and "left Britain 
unprepared for it when it came."8 
Lord Beloff may be right about nonviolence; even most British 
pacifists abandoned political claims for their beliefs in 1939 and 
based their arguments solely on ethical grounds. And Lord Hume 
may be justified in crying up the dangers of unilateral 
disarmament in 1983. But their "lessons" of history are suspect for 
two reasons. Firstly, their range of parallels is too limited. It is not 
possible to argue, for example, that neutrality or non-alignment 
will always endanger national and international security. The 
examples of Switzerland and Sweden argue one way and those of 
Belgium and Holland quite another. To draw a lesson from one 
age or one country has obvious hazards. Moreover, their 
generalizations about the 1930s do not inspire confidence because 
they rest on a superficial historical analysis. 
Three points must be made about military unpreparedness and 
the "pacifists" of the 1930s. Firstly, it was budget-cutting 
governments during the 1920s that left British services poorly 
prepared for the 1930s. During Admiral Lord Beatty's term as First 
Sea Lord (1919-1927), the Board of Admiralty repeatedly pleaded 
to be allowed a small but steady building program which would 
prevent the fleet from becoming obsolete, stop the loss of skilled 
men from shipbuilding and armament industries, and avoid a 
more expensive upsurge of construction when and if an 
emergency arose. The Board of Admiralty was rebuffed and by 
the early 1930s the sea-going fleet and defense industries were in 
a parlous state. Naval historians have recorded the sad effects of 
the "(almost) unilateral disarmament" of the 1920s. During the 
Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936 the entire reserve of anti-aircraft 
ammunition was sent to the Mediterranean fleet, leaving the 
home fleet with none. In order to catch up in 1936 and 1937 the 
Admiralty ordered armour plate from the Skoda works, but little 
had been delivered before Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia and 
diverted British orders to his own forces. "You cannot build ships 
in a hurry with a Supplementary Estimate," Lord Fisher had 
warned years before, but this is what Britain tried to do in 
1935- 1939. 9 
Secondly, when commentators refer to a pacifist movement 
with a "constituency of millions" during the 1930s, they are using 
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the term "pacifist" to include those who sought to avoid war 
through international cooperation, if necessary by the controlled 
use of force, as well as those who believed that war was always 
wrong. In the early 1930s the distinction between these anti-war 
viewpoints was not often made but it is misleading if 
commentators of the 1980s fail to do so. 10 It is possible that the 
first group, the internationalists, were unrealistic about the 
chances of disarmament by international agreement after Hitler 
carne to power, especially after Germany left the Disarmament 
Conference and the League of Nations in 1933, and about the 
security system of the league, but they did not favor unilateral 
disarmament and they did not oppose the use of force to deter 
aggression and uphold international law. 
Thirdly, the national government did not initiate supplementary 
estimates before 1935 because its leaders feared that a "pacific 
democracy" would reject a rearmament prograrn. 11 The politicians 
simply waited until the public mood changed. But the 
government's reading of public opinion before 1935 was not 
necessarily correct. There was an upsurge of pacifist sentiment in 
the early 1930s, and opposition parties berated the government 
for the failure of the Disarmament Conference, but opinion polls 
in 1934 reflected an anxious and confused rather than a strictly 
pacific public. 
In the spring of 1934 a number of Lord Rotherrnere's 
newspapers polled readers for their views on the league, 
disarmament, and rearmament in the air. The Bristol Evening 
World concluded that the polls showed "a peaceful motive 
underlying a desire for a strong defense." 12 The Rotherrnere 
plebiscites were limited and local, but even the famous Peace 
Ballot of 1934-1935, involving more than 1IY2 million voters, was 
not, in spite of its popular name, a rejection of arms. Of particular 
interest were the answers to the two parts of question five:'J 
Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, 
the other nations should combine to compel it to stop by 
(a) economic and non-military measures? 
Yes: 10,096,626 (86.8%) Doubtful: 
No: 636,195 ( 5.5%) No answer: 
(b) if necessary, military measures? 
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27,369 ( 0.2%) 
862,707 ( 7.4%) 
Yes: 6,833,803 (58.7%) 
No: 2,366,184 (20.3%) 
Doubtful: 41,058 ( 0.4%) 
No answer: 2,381,485 (20.4%) 
Winston Churchill later cited the returns on question five as 
evidence that Britons were "willing and indeed resolved, to go to 
war in a righteous cause," provided that all action was taken 
under the auspices of the league. 14 Philip Noel-Baker, an ardent 
supporter of the league, went further and claimed that the British 
people were ready to fulfill their obligations under the covenant 
and stop Mussolini by armed force if that was required. 15 These 
judgments are suspect: the image of a stout-hearted people eager 
to defend the league fitted too neatly with policy preferences of 
Churchill and Baker. A perceptive observer, Harold Nicolson, an 
experienced diplomat and member of Parliament, observed, soon 
after the votes were in, that the ballot was not an expression of 
national determination but an "expression of ill-considered 
national desires. In other words, it expressed what the country 
wanted to happen; it did not express what they were prepared to 
do."l6 
Still, the opinion polls of 1934 suggest that the government 
might have adopted Churchill's strategy during the early 1930s: to 
speak frankly and to campaign for 'Arms and the Covenant." The 
public might have been reconciled to a rearmament program 
linked to international obligations. Instead, the government 
passively waited for events to educate the country. For this it 
drew Churchill's celebrated rebuke: "I have heard it said that the 
Government had no mandate for rearmament until the General 
Election (in 1935). Such a doctrine is wholly inadmissible. The 
responsibility of the Ministers for the public safety is absolute and 
requires no mandate." 17 After 1935 the government could blame 
neither the opposition nor a pacific public. It commanded 
enormous majorities in Parliament ready to vote for any measure 
of defense requested by the ministers. 
III 
The first Oxford fighting resolution was not meant to provoke 
the public. It gained attention and notoriety only when critics 
sought to expunge the motion. The worldwide publicity, followed 
by Churchill's effort to discredit the debate, did much to create 
the legend that the Oxford vote had influenced Mussolini and 
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Hitler. The first myth gave rise to another, more general and 
complex, that the "pacifists" were largely responsible for obliging 
British politicians to negotiate with the dictators from weakness. 
Both legends offered convenient scapegoats and diverted 
attention from the fact that many, in and out of government, were 
responsible for the failure to deter Hitler. 
The recent Oxford debate shows how powerful is a certain view 
of the 1930s; it holds in its grip the minds of many in Britain, 
especially the survivors of the age. Their present frame of 
reference is largely determined by what they believe occurred 
during the previous years. The urge to draw lessons from the 
1930s also betrays a strong and persuasive belief that the future 
will closely parallel the recent past. But the popular view of the 
1930s preached by those who recently welcomed the "atonement" 
of Oxford rests on a false premise and inadequate information. 
The victorious debaters of 1983, perhaps unwittingly, have placed 
at the service of contemporary propagandists a shallow and 
distorted history. 
The Oxford debates do confirm one melancholy truth: that 
failure creates a need for scapegoats. Therefore, if the politicians 
miscalculate in the 1980s, as they did in the 1930s, there will be a 
new search for scapegoats, and more speeches of atonement and 
recrimination, perhaps in an Oxford Union debate of 2033. 
NOTES 
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